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We investigate the question whether firms in the manufacturing sector in Africa are credit 
constrained. The fact that few firms obtain credit is not sufficient to prove constraints, since 
certain firms may not have a demand for credit while others may be refused credit as part of 
profit maximising behaviour by banks. To investigate this question, we use direct evidence on 
whether firms had a demand of credit and whether their demand was satisfied in the formal 
credit market, based on panel data on firms in the manufacturing sector from six African 
countries. More than half the firms in the sample had no demand for credit. Of those firms 
with a demand for credit, only a quarter obtained a formal sector loan. In line with 
expectations, our analysis suggests that banks allocate credit on the basis of expected profits. 
However, controlling for credit demand, outstanding debt is positively related with obtaining 
further lending while micro or small firms are less likely to get a loan than large firms. The 
latter effect is strong and present in the regression, despite including several variables 
typically referred to as explaining why small or ‘informal’ firms do not get credit.  The role 
of outstanding debt is likely to be a reflection of inefficiency in credit markets, while the fact 
that size matters is consistent with a bias as well, although we cannot totally exclude that 
they reflect transactions costs on the part of banks. Finally, we could not detect any 
differences between countries in the effects of these factors in the credit allocation rule, 
although financial deepening is found to explain most of the country-specific fixed effects, 
shifting the probability of obtaining credit across the firm distribution.  
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1.   Introduction 
 
Credit programmes have long been a favoured intervention by donors and 
governments in Africa.  Implicit in these interventions is a concern that credit markets 
are not functioning well and that their malfunctioning results in low economic activity 
and growth. There are well-established reasons for credit markets not to be perfect (for 
a review see Hoff et al. (1993)). Given the intertemporal and risky nature of credit 
trade, the informational requirements and enforcement problems are large and agency 
costs will affect the outcome. The consequence is that uncollateralised lending will 
not take place at current real interest rates, i.e. the borrower cannot be a price taker. 
The borrower will be constrained by being forced to borrow money at higher interest 
rates to cover monitoring and enforcement costs or, as is usually the case, be rationed 
by not being allowed to borrow at all at these interest rates. In either case, less lending 
takes place than if there were no monitoring problems. Enforcement problems would 
further reduce credit market transactions.  
 
While the theoretical grounds for credit market imperfections are well-known, the 
empirical evidence on their existence and on their consequences for economic activity 
and growth are far less well established, both in industrialised countries and in 
developing regions like Africa. In this paper, we make use of firm-level data from six 
African countries to study both the existence and nature of credit constraints.  We use 
evidence on credit market participation and on the reasons for non-credit market 
participation to identify possibly constrained firms. We investigate whether agency 
and enforcement costs, or limited demand are at the root of non-participation in credit 
markets by firms. We also try to identify whether the banks’ lending policy is biased 
against certain firms, beyond monitoring and enforcement problems. Many 
interventions favour credit to small-scale enterprises, implicitly suggesting that these 
imperfections can be overcome.  
 
We use data on six countries: Ghana, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Côte d’Ivoire, Burundi, and 
Cameroon. The data were collected between 1992 and 1996 on a sample of 
manufacturing enterprises as part of the Regional Program for Enterprise 
Development (RPED), implemented by different teams and co-ordinated by the World 
Bank. Using the same sample, Biggs and Srivastava (1997) discuss the salient features 
of the credit transactions in the data sets. Fisman (1998) and Fafchamps (1997, 2000) 
have analysed trade credit transactions in these data. Using credit data from one round 
of the Zimbabwe survey, Raturi and Swamy (1999) analyse whether ethnic differences 
result in constraints in the formal credit market.  In this paper, we focus specifically on 
whether credit market constraints are similar across countries and whether small firms 
face a bias in lending by banks and financial institutions. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we discuss the problems of 
identifying credit constraints using firm level data and construct an empirical model 
for analysing the problem. In section 3 we present the data and provide some context 
on credit markets in the different countries. In this section, we attempt to distinguish 
firms according to their credit market participation and their credit demand. We 
investigate whether they are constrained in the credit market. In section 4, the 
econometric model is presented and the variables included in the analysis are 
discussed. The results are in section 5. Section 6 concludes.   2 
 
2.   Identifying and modelling credit constraints 
 
There is a vast literature on firm-level credit constraints in developed and developing 
countries. Most of the empirical literature focuses on the consequences of credit 
contraints in a standard neoclassical investment model (e.g. Fazzari et al. (1988), 
Bond and Meghir (1994), Scianterelli (1996), Hubbard (1998)).  Under a perfectly 
competitive credit markets, any financial information about the firm should be 
orthogonal to investment decisions and therefore to the investment path. In particular, 
following Miller-Modigliani’s theorem, firms should be indifferent between internal 
and external sources of funds, so any information related to the current liquidity of the 
firm (or other information related to the capital structure and asset position of the 
firm) should be irrelevant for investment.  The standard test for credit constraints 
consists of adding overidentifying restrictions to an equation describing the 
investment path, such as an Euler equation or a flexible accelerator model.  In most 
tests, significant effects on the overidentifying restrictions have been found, leading to 
the conclusion that credit constraints matter for investment, and by implication that 
firms are credit constrained.  However, in this literature the question is rarely asked 
whether there is direct evidence on the failure to participate in the credit market on the 
part of the firms in question, or more generally that the problems are indeed linked 
with problems in credit market functioning
1.  
 
In this paper, we are not taking this standard route, but look for more direct evidence 
on credit market participation and constraints faced by firms. We try to model 
explicitly the demand for external funds of firms and try to assess the apparent 
decision rules applied by financial institutions to grant loans.   We model the loan 
allocation process in two stages. First, the firm decides whether it wants to use 
liquidity for its business and whether it will apply for external funds for this purpose. 
Then, the loan is approved or not and investment plans implemented or adjusted 
accordingly. For the time being, we ignore the issue whether the firm wants to expand 
(invest), finance inventories or needs working capital for its operations. In the model, 
we focus on the first issue.  
 
Applying for loans implies transactions costs, in terms of preparation costs for the 
application and waiting time. As an alternative means of financing investment, we 
allow firms to build up internal funds, based on retained profits. Formally, we assume 
that firms maximise the stream of dividends to the owner (shareholders).  Let dt be the 
dividends paid in period t and u(dt) be the instantaneous utility derived from this 
dividend. We assume risk aversion (u’>0, u’’<0) and that the owner maximises 
expected utility at t, with θ the rate of time preference: 













                                                            
1 In the literature on developing countries, Tybout (1983) and Nabi (1989) are exceptions. Tybout 
(1983) provides an econometric analysis of the effects of credit market rationing on investment using 
data from Colombia. Nabi (1989) explicitly models credit rationing in a repressed financial system as a 
first step in a switching regression of investment. However, the underlying assumption in his model is 
that interest rates are so low that all firms want (infinite) credit to invest. Consequently, the choice 
between internal and external funds is irrelevant.    3 
 
We define an asset equation for internal funds Ft+1 consisting of initial internal funds 
(‘bank deposits’) which earned an interest rate r, profits at t (πt) and any loans B 
received at t. From this, we subtract repayment of debt inclusive of interest payments 
(1+i)Bt-1
2, dividend payments at t and investment qtIt  in which qt is the price of 
investment goods, i.e.: 
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We assume that loan applications at t (At) will only be approved (if at all) in period 
t+1.  Loans obtained Bt equal g(At-1). In general, an amount Bt is obtained from 
successful applications for At-1, with a maximum of At-1, while if the application fails 
0 is obtained. We simplify this further by assuming that all loans obtained are paid out 
in full and that the (firm specific) success rate is s, so that Et-1(Bt) = s.At-1.
3 
Applications for a loan do not only cost in terms of time, there are also costs c(At) for 
applying for a loan
4. We consider costs non-decreasing in At (c’ ≥ 0). A plausible 
assumption in this respect would be to have concave costs (c’’<0), so that small loan 
applications are relatively more costly.   
 
Let us define Kt as the capital stock, δ as the rate of depreciation, product prices pt, 
wages wt, labour Lt and a production function f(Kt,Lt), risky profits πt and, as before, 
qt as the price of capital (investment) goods. The capital asset equation can then be 
defined as
5: 
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We also impose a constraint on the value of loan applications, in that the firm’s 
current balance sheet must be providing sufficient net assets (capital goods plus 
internal funds minus outstanding debt) to serve as collateral for the loan application, 
but allowing for some firm specific constant B: 
 
  B B i F K q A t t t t t + + − + ≤ −1 ) 1 (  (5) 
 
Condition (5) can be viewed as a collateral constraint, although firm-specific 
circumstances (such as owner’s assets, other guarantees, networks with banks and 
others, extensive past banking relationships, and other reputational devices) may 
affect the ability to borrow despite the agency and enforcement problems involved in 
uncollateralised borrowing. We do not exclude the possibility that B is negative: 
                                                            
2 Note that, for simplicity, we assume that loans are only obtained for one year, after which they need to 
be repaid with interest and new funds may have to raised.  The consequence is that the stock of debt and 
any new lending is both denoted by B, saving on notation. Extending this for long term loans does not 
change the outcome of the model. 
3 We use standard assumptions for the production function (fK,fL>0 and fKK, fLL<0). The success rate is 
assumed to be independent of other risks facing the firm. 
4 Bernanke and Gertler (1989) introduce a similar cost element in using external funds, which they 
consider as the cost for titling or auditing when participating in the formal credit market, rather than 
using internal funds. 
5 For simplicity, risk is assumed to stem from output prices or from risk in the production function. We 
assume increasing returns to each factor, but at a decreasing rate (fL, fK >0, fLL, fKK<0).   4 
contract enforcement problems may mean that banks do not wish to lend to particular 
firms, despite the presence of collateral and stipulate other conditions (e.g. residency, 
etc.) on loan application. Note that the success rate s related to loan applications, is 
influenced by similar firm-specific factors. 
 
Finally, non-negativity constraints apply to internal funds, net assets and (applications 
for) external funds in each period: 
 0 ≥ t F  (6) 
 0 ) 1 ( 1 ≥ + − + − t t t t B i F K q  (7) 
 0 ≥ t A  (8) 
 
Note that (8) (non-negative loan applications) and (5) (the collateral constraint) imply 
(7) (which can be viewed as a bankruptcy constraint), so the latter does not need to be 
considered separately further. Except for the detail on the choices between applying 
for a loan or only using internal funds for financing investment and the presence of 
credit constraints via (5), this is a standard investment model. First-order conditions 
are therefore straightforwardly stated. First, owners will try to obtain a smooth flow of 
dividends, but may be constrained by the internal funds constraint (6). In particular, 
the optimal path of dividends will follow: 
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in which λ1 is the shadow cost (Langrange multiplier) on the nonnegativity constraint 
on internal funds (6). If it binds, then current dividends are lower than preferred by the 
owner, i.e. more funds need to be kept in the firm. Given the current cash flow, firms 
have the choice between investing in the firm or keeping the cash as internal funds, 
with firms investing in the firm (assuming positive Kt to start with) until: 
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Equation (10) illustrates the consequence of the existence of the cash flow constraint: 
if the constraint is binding, then investment will be lower than optimal, with marginal 
returns to capital larger than marginal and opportunity costs of investing in capital. 
Note that this situation may come about because of low current profits, high past debt, 
low initial internal funds or loans that were not approved. If the internal funds 
constraint is not binding, then (10) simply reduces to the condition that user cost of 
capital should in the optimum be equal to the return
6. 
 
Finally, we can derive the condition for loan applications by the firm. This is 
effectively a choice between putting in for a loan for an investment (or another 
purpose) and incurring some costs and interest charges, or using this money directly 
for the investment.  Let λ2t and λ3t be the shadow cost (Lagrange multipliers) for the 
collateral and non-negativity constraints (5) and (7). Then loan applications will 
satisfy the following Kuhn-Tucker condition: 
 
                                                            
6 Note that in this model, firms never have too much capital since they can always sell it. Adjustment 
costs or irreversibility would change this.    5 
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If the firm applies for a loan then λ3t =0 and equation (11) is satisfied with equality. If 
the current cash constraint nor the collateral constraint are binding (λ1t =0, λ2t =0), 
then firms will spend on loan applications until the marginal utility weighted expected 
return is equal to their marginal cost. However, the current cash constraint (to pay for 
the marginal cost of applying) or the collateral constraint could cause unexploited 
returns to investment via loans relative to returns to cash, taking into account 
information about the success rate of applications
7.  
 
Equation (11) shows the circumstances in which firms may not want to apply for 
loans: low profitability of investment relative to the interest rate on loans and high 
applications costs could imply no demand for external funds. Low perceived success 
rates would also reduce actual loan applications despite potentially profitable 
investments. Firms may be constrained due to credit market imperfections, lacking the 
cash to pay for the application costs or the collateral due to low current net worth 
and/or poor firm-specific collateral substitutes: cash and collateral constraints would 
leave unexploited profits.  
 
The model suggests a way of constructing an empirical model to identify the factors 
determining the demand for credit and how the market allocates credit across firms. 
First, we could try to identify the factors determining whether firms have a demand for 
external funds. From (10) and (11) it follows that, controlling for risk attitudes, the 
firm will consider:  
(a) the expected return on investment,  
(b) the opportunity cost of using own funds for this investment (i.e. factors affecting 
the cash constraint) and  
(c) the cost of outside funds (interest rate on loans).  
 
These factors are intrinsically related to investment demand. In a frictionless 
economy, without adjustment costs or market imperfections, past decisions will have 
taken into account all information on (a), (b) and (c), so that only new information or 
shocks would induce investment demand (beyond depreciation). Under certain 
assumptions, equation (10) could be simplified to yield the well-known martingale 
property of investment – investment follows a random walk. An implication for credit 
demand is that credit demand also only responds to shocks. However, this ignores at 
least two other reasons for demanding credit in any period. First, if adjustment costs in 
capital allocation are present, then credit demand will be affected by desired capital 
holdings in each period. Secondly, credit may not just be required for investment, but 
                                                            
7 If investment returns and deposit interest rates are equal, (10) is valid with equality. In that case, 
without collateral or cash constraints, firms would only apply for loans if expected returns to holding 
the loan in cash r are higher than the expected interest rate charges on this loan and the costs of the 
application. In particular, with non-risky r and i, and s independent of other risk, s.r ≥ s.i + c’(At)(1+r). 
This would only be the case if the borrowing interest rate is low relative to deposit interest rates.   6 
also to provide liquidity for working capital needs. In the empirical model, we will try 
to take these factors into account as well. 
 
Proxies for the demand for external funds would include new information on changes 
in the general or sectoral economic conditions, etc. Desired capital stock and past 
investment will provide information as well. Working capital needs may be proxied 
by cash flow or access to alternative short term financing, such as overdrafts. The 
opportunity cost of using own funds is affected by the liquidity of the firm: profits, 
cash flow, access to overdraft facilities and to other sources of credit, such as informal 
loans. Finally, although not explicitly modelled, given limited liability, firms have 
incentives to express a demand for credit to finance risky projects while using own 
funds for safe projects, which with imperfect information, may give rise to adverse 
selection problems in the credit market.  
 
However, given credit market imperfections, firms may prefer external funds to 
internal funds but would not apply for loans for the following reasons: 
(d) collateral requirements are not met or the success rate of applications is less than 
one, and 
(e) the costs associated with loan applications (transactions costs) are too high. 
 
Factors affecting current collateral include assets, outstanding debt, but also 
opportunities for collateral substitutes, such as ethnicity, networks, legal status, 
ownership structure, firm age, whether it keeps accounts, links with the financial 
sector, such as through bank accounts, overdrafts, financing for start-up, etc. Note that 
these factors may also affect contract enforcement. Any information available to firms 
on the ways of screening by firms should also be included since it affects the 
(perceived) success rate for loan applications. Transactions costs may also be affected 
by these factors, as well as factors such as the characteristics of the owner or manager, 
location (for example in major cities), scale of activities (firm size), etc.  Collateral 
requirements and transactions costs will imply that there will be firms that do not 
prefer internal funds to external funds but still not apply for loans. We will consider 
these firms to be constrained, as will be those firms applying for but not receiving 
credit. In the empirical analysis, we will attempt to distinguish firms that do not want 
to participate in credit markets from those apparently constrained by credit market 
imperfections. 
 
In principle, profit maximising banks would wish to use complete information on 
firms to assess any loan application. In this respect, they would want to use (a), (c) and 
(d) to assess any applications, and would find information about the opportunity costs 
of own funds within the firm also useful. However, in practice they have not the 
means to collect this information, or transactions and monitoring costs would be too 
high.  We will assume that they form expectations about the expected return on 
investment using information on sectoral and country-wide conditions, and on firm 
size and other basic, directly observable firm characteristics. Also, past lending is 
likely to be observable to the financial sector. Finally, information on collateral 
requirements and the success rate reflects constraints imposed by the banks, so they 
are also assumed to be fully observable to them.  
   7 
Success rates on loan applications s and the extent to which banks wish to enforce the 
collateral constraint are determined by the financial sector, even though they may be 
influenced by firm-specific factors. Agency problems, related to asymmetric 
information and contract enforcement in the lending market, may mean that credit 
rationing is optimal for the banks. For example, with adverse selection due to (for the 
banks) unobservable risk of default among the firms, banks may find it optimal to 
restrict lending in order to influence the mix of applications. The rationing scheme 
used by the banks may be random, such that identical firms may be treated differently. 
In that case, conditional on applications, firm characteristics should not matter in the 
allocation of credit. Of course, the banking sector has incentives to screen firms. 
Banks may use firm or sector specific rules to identify the firms to lend to, to 
maximise its own profits, taking into account any risk aversion they may have. In this 
respect, the characteristics used to screen may go beyond factors directly related to 
future profitability of the proposed investment plans of firms, but which matter for the 
way the banks perceive the risks of the lender. However, this suggests a profit 
maximising banking sector (allowing for risk attitudes) achieving a constrained 
Pareto-efficient outcome, even though not all firms may obtain as much credit as they 
would wish at current terms and conditions. Nevertheless, a common complaint by 
firms is that credit allocation is not done according to efficiency.  If one were to 
identify the allocation rule used by the banking sector and one finds that this is not 
consistent with the costs related to agency or enforcement problems, but related to 
other factors, then one may be able to conclude that credit allocation is indeed 
inefficient and biased against certain firms.  In the econometric analysis, we will try to 
identify whether this is indeed the case.  
 
3.    Credit market participation by African manufacturing enterprises 
 
The data used in this paper is a sample drawn from a survey of firms in the 
manufacturing sectors of Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Burundi and Côte 
d’Ivoire, interviewed as part of the RPED-survey programme organised by the World 
Bank. Firms interviewed range in size from micro (less than five employees) to those 
employing over a thousand. For four of the countries, three rounds of interviews were 
conducted over the period 1992 to 1995. In Burundi, only one round of interviews was 
completed (in 1992). In Côte d’Ivoire two rounds were completed in 1995 and 1996. 
Firms were selected from four sectors in manufacturing, i.e food, textile, wood and 
metal. In most countries, a good sampling frame for the smaller or informal sector 
firms was missing. This has meant that the samples over-represent large and formal 
sector firms relative to the population. Details on the survey are in Bigsten et al. 
(1999a) and Biggs and Srivastava (1997). Appendix table 1 gives the dates of the 
surveys in each of the countries.  
 
In all countries considered, we can find a relatively wide array of financial institutions, 
with private banks coexisting with banks and financial institutions with mixed or 
government ownership. Nevertheless, in all countries, private or mixed ownership of 
banks is prevalent. In some, such as in Zimbabwe, the financial sector is even virtually 
exclusively private owned; in others, such as in Ghana, some largely government 
owned non-bank financial institutions exist as well. Kenya, Zimbabwe and Côte 
d’Ivoire can be considered as having relatively well-developed financial systems 
(Soyibo (1997)).  In all countries, despite the emergence of stock exchanges, capital   8 
markets remain underdeveloped, implying that equity financing has to come via 
internal funds or via the credit market. Government involvement in credit market 
institutions is continuing, as is the banking sectors’ role in financing the public sector.  
 
During this period, economic reform was continuing in these economies, including 
some initiatives related to monetary and banking reform.  In the 1970s and 1980s, 
financial repression, with resulting negative real interest rates and extensive 
government controls was prevalent in Africa. In recent years, different initiatives as 
part of structural adjustment programmes have sought to rectify this situation in the 
economies considered. In Ghana, reforms started early, in 1983, with financial sector 
reforms since the second part of the 1980s. Gradually, liberalisation of the banking 
sector resulted in more private sector involvement, but initially the financial 
infrastructure and legal framework were weak. Since 1989, interest rates are freely 
determined through inter-bank transactions. In Zimbabwe, interest rates were 
liberalised as part of the structural adjustment programme (ESAP) in 1990, resulting 
in very high interest rates in subsequent years. In Cameroon, and to a lesser extent as 
in Côte d’Ivoire, a crisis developed in the financial and banking system after a serious 
of shocks in the mid-1980s. Liberalisation in Cameroon was started in 1989, with 
further financial sector reforms on the agenda. Reforms included the setting up an 
institution for delinquent loan recovery, debt rescheduling for private banks and the 
public sector and several regulatory changes.  Macroeconomic instability continued 
well into the 1990s, partly rectified by the devaluation of 1994. The crisis in the 
banking sector was by no means resolved by these measures. 
 
In Kenya, private sector involvement and diversity in financial services offered has 
been exceptional for African standards; nevertheless many government controls 
remained in place at the time of the survey. Since 1991, interest rates have been 
liberalised. Since then, however, interest rates have often remained negative, probably 
linked to closely knit business interests, including between public and private sector 
institutions. Lending by the public sector remains high, crowding out private lending. 
During the survey period, the system was seriously under threat, with half the banking 
system in distress or in questionable financial order, mainly linked to poor lending 
policies. The Ministry of Finance has exempted many banks from regulations under 
the Banking Act. Property rights on collateral are also poorly enforced by the judicial 
system.  
 
Table 1 gives an overview of growth, financial deepening and interest rates. During 
the period 1991-95, Côte d’Ivoire experienced the highest growth rates, but this hides 
negative growth in the period 1993-94, before the devaluation of the Franc CFA. 
Ghana continued to grow each year, while stagnation continued in Zimbabwe, 
Cameroon and Kenya. Real interest rates where only systematically positive in Ghana. 
In Côte d’Ivoire and Cameroon, they turned strongly negative with relatively high 
inflation after the devaluation in 1994, which was a temporary effect - high positive 
rates were noted in the preceding years and afterwards. In Zimbabwe, rates turned 
strongly positive in the latter part of the period considered. As the discussion above 
suggested, negative interest rates are usually not linked with official lending policy at 
cheap rates. In general, nominal interest rates were high in all countries considered 
and negative rates directly stem from higher inflation than officially foreseen. 
Observed periods of apparent financial repression mainly stem from macroeconomic   9 
instability. Finally, in terms of monetary deepening, Côte d’Ivoire and Kenya have the 
highest degree as measured by M2 over GDP. In general, they can be considered to be 
low. There is no evidence of a systematic increase in financial deepening in recent 
years, despite the reforms.  In conclusion, due to the lack of well-developed capital 
markets, the financial sector is the main source for external funds in all countries 
considered. Liberalisation and reforms have started to open up the banking sector, but 
concerns about the strength and viability of the system remain in many of these 
economies. Large fluctuations in real interest rates linked to continuing 
macroeconomic instability will not contribute to a favourable lending climate. 
Concerns about the institutional structure and the link with the political establishment 
remain as well. 
 
Table 1 Monetary deepening, growth and real interest rates 
  Average 1991-1995  Average during  Sample Period 














Ghana  0.11 4.5  2.1 0.11 4.7 10.6 
Côte  d'Ivoire  0.16 7.1  0.6 0.17 8.6 -11.4 
Burundi  0.11 3.6 -1.0 0.12 2.3  8.0 
Zimbabwe  0.13 0.9  -1.4 0.12 -0.3 -1.2 
Kenya  0.16 1.6 -0.1 0.17 0.7 -4.9 
Cameroon  0.10 -1.9  0.9 0.09 -0.8 -6.0 
Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF. Real interest rates are calculated using the discount rate 
at the central bank minus the inflation rate in the period. 
 
In this paper, we will focus on data on credit market participation, more particularly 
on demand for and access to credit, from the point of view of firms in the 
manufacturing sector. We do not have access to data to model in detail bank policy 
nor loan performance. In the survey, questions were asked about whether firms 
applied for loans, if not, why not and if they applied whether applications were 
approved
8.  Also, details on recent lending experiences are available as well. 
 
Table 2 gives an overview of some of the firms’ involvement in credit markets and 
other characteristics. First, we notice that in most countries, the percentage of firms 
receiving loans is very small. Formal sector debt as a percentage of capital is also 
relatively low
9. Most lending is collateralised, with few differences across countries. 
Most non-collateralised loans appear to have alternative guarantees and conditions 
attached. The value of collateral is typically high: in all countries it is on average 
higher than the value of the loan (on average more than twice).  
                                                            
8The survey also included several questions asking the subjective perception of the manager of the 
major problems for the firm, including for firm expansion. The respondent could identify finance as a 
constraint and assign ordinal intensities. In general, a lot of complaints were found – in most countries 
lack of credit was the most single important complaint. However, this sort of question has to be treated 
with caution because the respondent may well hope that participation in a world bank survey may carry 
prospects of easy financing and so the shrewd response is to declare a need for more capital.  
9 The capital definition used in this paper is the replacement value of plant and equipment. In some 
cases, sales values are used when replacement values are missing.    10 
 
Many more firms obtain overdrafts than loans. The number of overdrafts is especially 
high in Kenya and Zimbabwe: 60 percent or more of the firms have one. However, the 
use of overdrafts appears to be very different in both countries: in Kenya, overdrafts 
are reportedly regularly used to finance investment, but in Zimbabwe, banks are 
known to scrutinise carefully firm accounts to ensure that no hard core debt develops 
in this way (Biggs and Srivastava (1997)).  The Cameroon and Kenya micro-evidence 
is consistent with the perceived crisis in the banking system, with high debts 
presumably linked to bad loans for parts of the economy. Alternative sources of credit 
are limited. Informal sector borrowing, while not uncommon, remains low in all 
countries considered. Only in Ghana, where formal credit and especially overdrafts 
seem rare, informal loans are more common
10. Nevertheless, informal credit markets 
are relatively unimportant for the manufacturing sector in these economies. The 
survey also found that ROSCAs were irrelevant and virtually absent in most countries 
except for Cameroon (Biggs and Srivastava (1997)).  
 
We also report on likely reasons for credit market participation. Just under half the 
firms report to have invested in plant and equipment in the last year. Still, the 
investment rates (relative to capital) are very low at on average only about 12 
percent
11.  Note also that Cameroon, the country with the highest percentage of firms 
receiving credit and high debt relative to capital, has the lowest proportion of firms 
investing. This suggests that credit demand in Cameroon is not mainly related to 
investment demand.  
 
Working capital needs may be another reason for high credit demand. We use the total 
costs (material inputs and other costs) plus the wage bill as a proxy of the cash flow 
needed, relative to the capital stock. Côte d’Ivoire has the highest ratio, consistent 
with the fact that they are using most overdrafts relative to capital. Note finally that 
trade credit (from suppliers) provides an important means of financing working 
capital. A large number of firms are involved in receiving trade credit, with the 
highest involvement in Zimbabwe and the lowest in Burundi. For most firms, it 
provides the single most important source of working capital financing, with 62 
percent of firms receiving some at the time of the survey. Relative to capital, it is very 
significant, and well above the value of overdraft facilities received
12.  Trade credit is 
analysed in detail by Cuevas et al. (1993), Fisman (1998), Fafchamps et al. (1995) and 







                                                            
10 As will become clear below, this is mainly related to the relatively small size of the average firm in 
the Ghanaian sample. 
11 Only in Burundi was investment larger, although the reason appears mainly that we are dealing with a 
sample with relatively larger firms. 
12 Note that the data reported only include trade credit received, not trade credit given to e.g. customers, 
which would reduce the net rates considerably.   11 
Table 2 Firm characteristics and credit markets 








Received loan in last year?  0.14  0.08  0.09  0.06  0.11  0.15  0.10 
Debt to banks as % of capital   0.12  0.19  0.06  0.03  0.11  0.19  0.12 
         
% firms with overdraft facility  0.42  0.44  0.43  0.24  0.60  0.66  0.48 
Overdraft  as % of capital  0.07  0.14  0.19  0.05  0.15  0.17  0.14 
         
% firms with informal sector debts  0.10  0.16  0.04  0.22  0.09  0.14  0.13 
Informal debt as % total capital  0.08  0.04  0.08  0.11  0.02  0.05  0.06 
         
% firms currently receiving trade credit  0.44  0.62  0.55  0.46  0.62  0.81  0.62 
Trade credit outstanding as % capital  0.07  0.26  0.34  0.21  0.29  0.26  0.27 
         
% firms providing collateral (formal 
loans) 
0.79 0.77 0.69 0.69 0.91 0.75 0.78 
Collateral value to loan size ratio  1.66  1.22  1.63  2.39  2.48  2.01  2.13 
         
% firms invested in last year  0.46  0.25  0.50  0.45  0.43  0.69  0.46 
Investment as % of capital  0.24  0.10  0.11  0.11  0.10  0.11  0.12 
Costs  as  %  capital  3.08 1.98 4.28 3.45 2.14 2.47 2.70 
Observations  119 527 434 512 657 531  2780 
Pooled sample over time and countries (2780 firms). Collateral data for those firms reporting details. 
 
In short, these data suggest that financial market involvement, especially in the form 
of borrowing, is limited, but there are differences across countries. There are also 
important differences with respect to the size of the firms. Table 3 gives the same 
characteristics by firm size, based on the number of employees.  The differences are 
striking. Large firms receive more loans and have, relative to capital, a higher 
indebtedness. They have far more access to overdraft facilities. They rely less on 
informal credit, but even micro and small firms have relatively low informal debt 
relative to capital. Trade credit is more important for all firm groups, but even here, 
large firms have far more access. About 90 percent of the large firms have outstanding 
debts to suppliers. Large firms invest far more, even though the amounts involved 
relative to capital remain modest on average. Small firms appear to have more need of 
working capital relative to capital, probably linked to undercapitalisation of their 
activities. Finally, the use and relative value of collateral is not different for large or 
smaller firms. 
 
Small firms have less credit, but does this mean they are constrained in the credit 
market? We define firms as “unconstrained” in the credit market if they state that they 
do not wish to obtain external funds (i.e. no credit demand) or that they were able to 
obtain a loan. Those that applied and were refused, and those that did not apply 
because they expected to be refused, are considered “constrained”. Note that this 
definition is one of potential “loan rationing”, i.e. we identify whether a firm that 
would have liked a loan could not get one (type II rationing). We cannot account for 
cases of “size rationing” (type I rationing), in which firms borrow less than desired or 
for firms that are facing higher interest rate costs, due to monitoring costs imposed 
following the credit market informational asymmetries. In short, a strict definition of 
credit constraints is used. In the following tables, the data underlying these choices are 
summarised, using pooled data over three rounds.  
   12 











Received loan in last year?  0.02  0.07  0.11  0.21  0.10 
Debt to banks as % of capital   0.07  0.11  0.14  0.18  0.12 
          
% firms with overdraft facility  0.10  0.30  0.64  0.86  0.47 
Overdraft  as % of capital  0.06  0.09  0.16  0.25  0.14 
          
% firms with informal sector debts  0.16  0.16  0.09  0.09  0.13 
Informal debt as % total capital  0.07  0.09  0.02  0.04  0.06 
          
% firms currently receiving trade credit  0.32  0.53  0.70  0.90  0.62 
Trade credit outstanding as % capital  0.15  0.23  0.33  0.35  0.27 
          
% firms providing collateral (formal loans)  0.73  0.78  0.81  0.77  0.78 
Collateral value to loan size ratio  1.82  2.48  1.92  2.18  2.13 
          
% firms invested in last year  0.33  0.38  0.45  0.71  0.46 
Investment as % of capital  0.09  0.10  0.07  0.09  0.12 
Costs as % capital  3.89  3.14  2.21  1.90  2.70 
Observations 645  330  546  510  2031 
Pooled sample across countries and time. 
 
Table 4 gives the distribution of firms applying for loans in the previous year across 
countries. In table 5, the distribution is given for different size groups. There seem to 
be some differences across countries, but overall a large amount did not apply for 
loans. From those applying, the majority of firms obtain loans
13. Overall, about a fifth 
of firms applied for loans, with just under 60 percent obtaining them.  Across the size 
distribution, the differences are large with much fewer applications and a smaller 
success rate among the smaller firms. 
 
Table 4  Formal credit market participation by Country (percentages)  








did not apply for a loan  77  80  84  86  82  79  82 
applied and did not receive  9  12  7  8  6  6  8 
applied and received a loan  14  8  9  6  11  15  10 
 
Table 5  Formal credit market participation by Firm Size (percentages of firms) 
 Micro  Small  medium  large all 
 (1-5)  (6-25)  (26-100)  (100+)   
       
did not apply  92  82  80  75  82 
applied and did not receive  6  11  9  5  8 
applied and received  2  7  11  20  10 
 
The large number of firms not applying does not mean that they are not credit 
constrained, since they may not want to incur the transactions if they suspect they will 
not obtain any loans. In table 6, the reasons are given why they did not apply for a loan 
in the last year by country and in table 7 by firm size.  It seems that about 34 percent 
                                                            
13 For a small number of loan applications, no decision had been reached at the time of the survey. 
These observations were dropped from the data.   13 
of firms reported that they did not apply because they did not need one and another 14 
percent did not want to incur debt or had already too much debt. But quite a few firms 
gave reasons more closely related to being constrained: 12 percent reported not to 
apply because did not think they would get one, 9 percent did not have sufficient 
collateral and 8 percent found the process too difficult. High interest rates were quoted 
by 9 percent of firms.  
 
There are important differences in these reasons across the size distribution: very few 
large firms reported that they did not apply because they thought they would not get a 
loan, while it is the main reason why the smallest firms did not apply. Collateral is 
similarly rarely cited as a reason by large firms. Large firms mainly report that they 
did not want loans as a reason for not applying. Debt and difficulties with the 
application process are relatively more important for the smaller firms.  
 
Table 6  Why did firms not apply for loans? By country. (percentages of firms) 
 Cameroon  Cote 
d’ivoire 
Ghana Kenya Zimba- 
bwe 
Burundi All 
Inadequate collateral (C) 
13 7  12  8  8 3  9 
don’t want to incur debt (NC)  11  5  10  10  9  10  9 
Process too difficult (C)  6  7  12  7  7  1  8 
didn’t need one (NC)  34  26  29  29  51  49  34 
didn’t think I’d get one (C )  11  25  10  13  4  7  12 
Interest rate too high (NC)  8  16  6  5  10  16  9 
Already heavily indebted 
(NC) 
9  5 2 4 4  1 5 
Other  8  8 19  26 8  12  15 
Total  100  100 100 100 100  100 100 
C=constrained; NC=not constrained 
 










Inadequate collateral (C)  15  10  3  2 
9 
don’t want debt (NC)  9  11  9  5  9 
Process too difficult (C)  13  8  4  1  8 
didn’t need one (NC)  15  29  50  60  34 
didn’t think I’d get one (C)  23  14  6  3  12 
Interest rate too high (NC)  4  12  14  11  9 
Already heavily indebted (NC)  1  3  4  5  5 
Other 20  13  10  13  15 
         100 
 
It is possible to interpret these answers in terms of the existence of credit constraints. 
Some firms appear not to be interested in credit: they do not want a loan or do not find 
it in their interest to incur more or any debt. Others are clearly providing answers 
suggesting credit market constraints: those who do not have enough collateral, for 
whom the process is too difficult and others who think they will be refused a loan 
even if they are willing to pay current interest rates. These firms will be considered in   14 
the “constrained” group
14. One group is more problematic: those who report that high 
interest rates are the reason for not applying. It suggests that they are not willing to 
pay current prices, so that they can hardly be considered rationed. Nevertheless, they 
could be facing the increasing part of the supply curve due to monitoring cost, making 
credit too expensive for them. In this case they are indeed suffering the consequences 
of the market imperfections. Since we aim to focus more on rationed groups at given 
interest rates, we include the group reporting high interest rates as the reason for not 
applying, as belonging to the “unconstrained, no credit demand” group. To this group 
we also add those firms which do not want to borrow because they do not need them 
or do not want to have (more) debt.  
 
Combining this information with the information contained in table 4 and 5, we can 
allocate all firms in three groups: those “unconstrained without credit demand”, those 
“constrained” defined as before, adding those rejected after applying for a loan and 
finally an “unconstrained with credit demand” group who obtained loans. Tables 8 
and 9 provide the frequencies of firms in these groups by firm size and by country.  
 
Table 8 Credit constraints by Firm Size  
 Micro  Small  Medium  Large  All 
no credit demand  33  50  67  66  55 
demand, but rejected *  64  42  21  10  33 
received loan  3  8  12  23  12 
*includes firms that suggested that a loan application would be rejected by banks 
 
Table 9 Credit constraints by country 
 Burundi  Cameroon  Cote 
d’Ivoire 
Ghana Kenya Zimbabwe All 
no credit demand  51  44  47  52  64  67  55 
demand, but rejected *
  34 47  42  40  24 17  33 
received loan  15  9  11  8  12  16  12 
*includes firms that suggested that a loan application would be rejected by banks 
 
As can be seen, a large proportion of firms - on average more than half - do not have 
any credit demand. About a third either applied and were rejected for loans, or did not 
apply expecting to be rejected, and can be considered constrained. Across the size 
distribution, the differences appear quite large. Close to two-thirds of the micro firms 
appear constrained, while this is only 10 percent for the large firms. A large number of 
large firms - about two-thirds - simply do not participate in the credit market because 
they do not want to, compared to only a third of the micro firms.  Very few micro-
firms apply for loans but this cannot be interpreted as meaning that they do not have a 
demand for external funds.  As most firms in Africa are micro and small firms, the 
evidence suggests that most are credit constrained. 
 
 
                                                            
14 Note that this classification is consistent with the theoretical discussion: firms have a demand for 
outside funds, but are not willing or able to apply because of the collateral constraint, perceived low 
success rates and high transactions costs. Note also that those applying but whose application was 
rejected would be firms which found it in their interest to apply (and incur costs) given the perceived 
success rate. Applications are still risky and those firms with rejected applications faced the ‘bad’ ex-
post outcome.   15 
4. Econometric model 
 
In the econometric analysis, we investigate the factors determining whether firms have 
a demand for external funds and whether it is satisfied. We investigate the screening 
applied by banks and we examine why particular firms appear to be constrained. In 
line with the theoretical model, we consider a decision process in two stages. First, the 
firm decides whether it has a demand for external financing. In a second stage, we ask 
whether for those firms with a demand for external financing, there is a matching 
supply of credit by financial sector. The first stage involves an analysis on the entire 
sample; the second stage involves only those with a demand for credit
15.  
 
Given the data, for both stages in the credit allocation process, the depedent variable is 
binary, so we use a probit model. In principle, the choices are interlinked, while the 
second stage is only observed for certain outcomes in the first stage.  Defining yi1=1 if 
credit demand is satisfied and yi2=1 if the firm has a demand for external finance, the 
model becomes: 
  1 1 1 1 i i e x z
i + = β ; 1 1 = i y  if  0 1 > i z , 0 1 = i y  otherwise 
  2 2 2 2 i i e x z + = β ; 1 2 = i y  if  0 2 > i z , 0 2 = i y  otherwise  (12) 
  1 i y  is observed only when  2 i y =1 
  
Since it is quite likely that the errors in both stages are correlated, estimating the first 
equation (i.e. the second stage) while ignoring the information from the first stage (i.e. 
the selection process) would result in a sample selection bias. To estimate this model 
we can use a bivariate probit model with sample selection (or a Heckman probit), in 
which both the selection equation as the second stage equation are a probit model. 
Both stages are jointly estimated using maximum likelihood or using two-stage 
methods. In particular, it is assumed that (ei1, ei2) are bivariate normally distributed 
with E(ei1)= E(ei2)=0, Var(ei1)=Var(ei2)=1 and Cov(ei1, ei2)=  ρ (details are in Greene, 
1993, p.660-664).   
 
When running this regression on the data at hand, we may ignore the possible 
implications of the panel structure of the data. In particular, we assume that the errors 
are uncorrelated over time, despite the fact that observations are from the same firms. 
The panel nature would suggest that heterogeneity in present in the data and 
depending on the form of heterogeneity, causing inefficiency and even inconsistency 
of the estimators.  In general, the first equation (and similarly the second) in (12) can 
be written as follows: 
 
  t i t i i e x z
t i 1 1 1 1 + + = β α ; 1 1 = t i y  if  0 1 > t i z , 0 1 = t i y  otherwise  (13) 
 
Since the data are a sample of firms from a large population, it is reasonable to treat αi 
as random effects and more efficient estimators could be obtained by assuming that 
they are drawn from a time-invariant distribution. Below we report the random effects 
                                                            
15As in the previous section, we assume that those firms actually applying for loans and those not 
applying but suggesting they would have liked to can be considered together in the analysis of whether 
credit demand was satisfied. In appendix 3 we present a test on whether this is valid.   16 
estimator for each of the equations in (12). However, the random effects model 
assumes that the individual effects are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. 
This may be a strong assumption. For example, the heterogeneity may be reflecting 
unobserved differences in characteristics correlated with firm size or with outstanding 
debts. Standard or random effects probit estimators would result in inconsistent 
estimates. We therefore also report fixed effects estimates for the model. 
 
Implementing these panel data estimators on (12) is not self-evident. First, fixed 
effects probit models are not feasible (Greene, 1993, p. 655). Instead, Chamberlain’s 
conditional maximum likelihood estimator for the panel logit model, effectively a 
fixed effects estimator, will be reported. A random effects probit model is reported as 
well.  Using these panel data techniques, a bivariate sample selection model similar to 
(12) is not straightforward either (Maddala (1987)). Fixed and random effects 
estimates are therefore only reported for each of the stages separately. A final practical 
problem is that the fixed effects model effectively only uses firms shifting status 
during the panel period with respect to credit demand and constraints. Over this short 
panel, only a relatively limited number of firms do this, limiting the degrees of 
freedom considerably. As a consequence, these results have to be treated with 
considerable caution. Nevertheless, they can give some indication on whether the 
other results are seriously affected by firm heterogeneity correlated with other 
variables in the model. Furthermore, one of crucial variables of interest – firm size – 
does not change very much over a short panel, so that the fixed effects estimators may 
not give much information on the relevance or existence of a ‘true’ size effect, 
controlling for fixed heterogeneity. 
 
In terms of explanatory variables, the factors determining the demand for credit 
include those determining whether firms want to expand their activities. As discussed 
in section 2, without credit market imperfections, only shocks to the conditions faced 
by the firm in the economy should matter for investment. To proxy those shocks, we 
use time, sector and country dummies. To allow for adjustment costs and past 
constraints in financing investment, we include a measure of desired capital, based on 
Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger (1995). Appendix 2 gives the details. Working 
capital needs will be proxied by measures of liquidity: profit rates, alternative sources 
of funds, such as informal credit, outstanding formal debt and access to overdraft 
financing. These factors will also determine the demand for external funds relative to 
internal sources for financing investment. Other controls for transactions and 
opportunity costs of funds are variables describing the legal status (limited liability, 
personal firm, co-operative, state firm etc.) and ownership structure (the relative 
importance of state, domestic and foreign ownership). Firm characteristics, such as 
whether the firm owns other business, characteristics and assets of the owner, firm 
age, whether it keeps accounts, etc. are also included to control for heterogeneity in 
credit demand. They can be seen as proxies for transactions costs in applying for 
loans, access to different sources of collateral and alternative sources of finance. 
Finally, dummies describing the size of the firm are entered as well, effectively asking 
whether the other characteristics included sufficiently proxy for heterogeneity 
correlated to firm size. 
 
Firms that have a demand for external credit may either receive a loan or stay 
frustrated (either by being refused or by expecting to be refused a loan). In principle,   17 
banks would like to use similarly extensive information to allocate credit as used by 
firms to decide about their demand for external finance, since these factors will affect 
the likelihood of repayment, agency and enforcement problems, or in short, the 
creditworthiness of the firm. However, it is unlikely that banks can use the full 
information set used by firms. Even if the firm has accounts, banks are unlikely to 
have up-to-date and complete information on issues such as profitability, desired 
capital stock, access to informal and other sources of credit, etc. and other current 
firm-specific characteristics. We will assume that banks use sector-specific 
predictions of profitability for each firm, based on sector, country, time, ownership, 
legal status and other easily observable characteristics. We assume that the banks have 
access to information on the current formal debt position and on the capital of the 
firm, which they can use to assess its current net worth and the ability to provide 
collateral for loans. We use the debt-capital ratio and expect that higher rates would 
reduce the willingness of the financial sector to satisfy the demand for credit of the 
firms, since the risk of bankruptcy may be higher. If factors such as predicted 
profitability or debt ratios dominate the allocation of credit, then one can hardly speak 
of credit constraints; rather, banks are screening good debts from bad debts.  
 
Agency and enforcement problems are other reasons for credit to be refused and a 
cause of market imperfections. Ownership structure and the legal status of firms is 
bound to affect the banks’ monitoring costs; they definitely will affect the 
enforcement possibilities. We also include controls for whether firm keeps accounts, 
firm age, characteristics and assets of the owner. They could facilitate monitoring or 
provide collateral substitutes. Note that rationing on the part of banks may well be 
consistent with profit maximising behaviour on the part of banks. While there is a 
credit market failure, this does not necessarily mean an unreasonable bias by banks 
against certain types of firms. If, however, controlling for monitoring and transactions 
costs, banks reject loans to at least as profitable firms as those receiving loans, then 
the rationing scheme applied may not be consistent with profit maximisation.  
 
Finally, this modelling approach implies that identification of the sample selection 
equation occurs via firm-specific time-varying variables, such as current profitability, 





Table 10 gives the descriptive statistics on the variables used in the regression 
analysis. The constrained firms typically appear to be more likely to be private firms, 
with one owner, small in size, younger, not keeping accounts, with owners that do not 
have other business or assets that could be used for collateral. Firms with no credit 
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Table 10 Descriptive statistics 




Sector      
Wood 0.21  0.25  0.22 
Textile 0.26  0.28  0.29 
Metal 0.23  0.26  0.21 
Food 0.28  0.19  0.25 
Legal status     
Solo firm  0.26  0.50  0.17 
Partnership 0.07  0.10  0.04 
Limited liability  0.50  0.25  0.57 
State corporation  0.01  0.01  0.02 
Cooperative 0.01  0.02  0.03 
Subsidiary domestic  0.02  0.01  0.04 
Subsidiary foreign  0.03  0.00  0.02 
Ownership     
Private domestic firm  0.65  0.83  0.65 
Private foreign firm  0.15  0.08  0.11 
Private domestic  & foreign firm  0.14  0.07  0.17 
State/private domestic  0.01  0.00  0.02 
State/private foreign   0.02  0.01  0.04 
State/private foreign & dom  0.01  0.00  0.01 
Country & location     
Zimbabwe 0.29  0.12  0.36 
Côte d'Ivoire  0.08  0.12  0.09 
Cameroon 0.14  0.27  0.16 
Kenya 0.30  0.18  0.24 
Ghana 0.17  0.28  0.13 
Burundi 0.03  0.03  0.02 
Firm in capital city?  0.68  0.66  0.77 
 
Firm characteristics     
Formal debt/capital
a  0.09 0.07 0.24 
Informal debt/capital  0.03  0.05  0.02 
Overdraft/capital 0.14  0.09  0.16 
Access to overdraft?  0.64  0.26  0.78 
Profit/capital ratio  0.72  0.86  0.77 
Predicted profit/capital ratio
b 0.73  0.88  0.72 
Mandated investment
c  0.06 0.00 0.12 
Mandated investment-alternative
d  0.16 0.19 0.21 
Micro firm  0.08  0.27  0.01 
Small firm  0.27  0.44  0.21 
Medium firm  0.35  0.20  0.27 
Large firm  0.30  0.09  0.50 
Employment level  153  53  292 
Firm age  19.8  11.8  19.5 
Accounts? 0.88  0.57  0.94 
Firms with owner characteristics
e  0.71 0.85 0.68 
Age owner  45.9  42.1  46.4 
Born in this town?  0.81  0.83  0.85 
Time spent in this town  23.2  21.4  24.6 
own other business?  0.36  0.28  0.47 
sex owner  0.95  0.97  0.99   19 
other business in sector  0.18  0.18  0.24 
own house,vehicle, farm?  0.68  0.54  0.67 
Number of observations (full 
information for regressions, 
including panel data for desired 
capital) 
770 390 161 
aFormal outstanding debt, excluding loans received in the current year. 
bPredicted profit rate, using information on sector, country, location, ownership, firm size and legal 
status. Country dummies interacted with time dummies. See table A.2 in appendix 4. 
cMandated investment, using calculated capital before investment in current period. 
dMandated investment, alternative measures, using lagged capital. Details in appendix 2. 
eDetailed survey questions on the (main) owners of firms were taken for private domestic firms, 
provided they were available for interview. For cooperatives, the chairman of the cooperative was 
interviewed. Subsequently, we will refer to them as ‘privately owned firms’. 
 
 
Table 11 gives the results of the estimation using the bivariate probit model with 
sample selection. We give the results for all firms, as well as for firms with an 
identifiable private owner, about whom we have further information
16. First, looking 
at the demand for credit, we find that co-operatives are more likely to have a demand 
for external finance (by 36 percent) and that firms with some foreign ownership have 
lower demand (17 percent less likely relative to private domestic firms), presumably 
reflecting access to other sources of finance. Access to overdrafts also reduces the 
demand for credit, while high indebtness (measured as outstanding debt excluding any 
loans obtained in the current year) makes a firm more likely to have currently a 
demand for external finance. The squared term is negative, but the overall effect only 
starts becoming negative at a ratio with debts 66 percent above total capital. Evaluated 
at the mean, a doubling of the ratio of debt relative to capital at the beginning of the 
period increases the demand for loans by 13 percent. As expected, younger firms also 
are more likely to demand external finance. For privately owned firms, we find 
broadly speaking the same effects, with additionally a positive effect on the demand 
for external finance when the owner owns other business as well. Note that ‘medium’ 
sized firms – between 26 and 100 employees – are less likely to have a demand for 
credit than micro, small as well as large firms (i.e. a 10 percentage points lower 
probability). The coefficients on micro and small firms are not significantly different 
from zero. In other words, controlling for a series of characteristics typically 
correlated with small or micro firms, such as keeping accounts, access to other sources 
of finance and ownership structure, the demand for credit is not significantly different 
for large and small or micro firms. If we observe differences in credit allocation 
between small and large firms, then differences in demand will not be able to explain 
them.  
 
Turning to the issue of whether demand is satisfied, we notice some interesting 
effects. First, firms with high expected profits are more likely to get credit than other 
firms – consistent with banks screening applications to obtain a portfolio of profitable 
ventures. In particular, evaluated at mean characteristics, doubling the expected 
profitability ratio increases the probability that a firm will get a loan by about 27 
percent
17. Secondly, we find very strong and significant firm size effects. Relative to 
                                                            
16 Selected marginal effects were calculated and reported in the text. 
17 Note that the reported marginal effects are conditional on expressing a demand for loans.   20 
large firms, micro firms have 31 percent less chance of having credit demand 
satisfied, while this is respectively 20 and 13 percent lower for small and medium 
firms. Note that this effect exists despite controls for whether firms have accounts and 
for characteristics of the owner, such as assets and ownership of other business 
interests. In other words, the size effects must reflect the role of other characteristics 
correlated with size, beyond these included in the regression. Thirdly, we also note a 
strong and positive effect of outstanding debt, although the square is negative again. 
We would have expected an overall negative effect, especially at high values of debt 
over capital  – highly indebted firms are likely to be quite risky to give additional 
loans to. For most reasonable values, we find a positive effect: the overall effect 
becomes negative for a debt-capital ratio of 1.76. Evaluated at the mean, a doubling of 
the debt over capital ratio increases the probability of having its credit demand 
satisfied by 13 percent for all firms. We find a similar effect for privately owned firms 
only.  To conclude, credit allocation is at least to some extent focused on more 
profitable firms and sectors. However, small and micro firms face a bias in credit 
allocation, not explained by obvious transactions costs characteristics, such as whether 
firms keep accounts or the lack of assets that may be used as collateral. In fact, we 
observe hysteresis in credit market relationships: banks appear to favour relationships 
with certain clients who have already substantial debt outstanding, even if these firms 
may well have a higher risk of default.  
 
These regressions ignore the panel dimension of the data. At least, by not taking into 
account heterogeneity, the estimates may be inefficient. Random effects estimators are 
reported in table 12. Generally speaking, the estimated coefficients and the implied 
marginal effects are very similar. Medium sized firms, foreign or younger firms and 
those with overdrafts are less likely to have a demand for credit, while highly indebted 
firms are more likely to do so. Privately owned firms with male owners or with an 
owner having other businesses are also more likely to have a demand for external 
finance.  Credit allocation by banks is influenced by profitability considerations, but 
the positive effect of outstanding debt and the clear additional negative effect of being 
a small firm remain as well. The size effects is present after controlling for and finding 
significant effects on other variables that may allow better monitoring by banks, such 
as accounts, being based in the capital city and firms with overdraft facilities. 
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Table 11   Sample selection model  
  Demand? (probit – selection equation)  Demand satisfied? (2
nd stage probit) 
  all firms  Firms with owner 
characteristics 
all firms  Firms with owner 
characteristics 
  coeff z-value  coeff z-value coeff z-value coeff z-value 
Solo firm   -0.01  -0.12   -0.03  -0.24   -0.06  -0.27   -0.10  -0.43  
Partnership  0.14  0.92   -0.03  -0.18   -0.36  -1.24   -0.45  -1.46  
State  corporation  0.26  0.75        0.12  0.23       
Cooperative  0.95 2.47  **  1.11 2.37  *  0.98 2.01  *  0.90 1.39   
Subsidiary domestic  0.15  0.56   -0.14  -0.21   0.07  0.17        
Subsidiary  foreign  -0.18  -0.52        3.07  0.01       
Private foreign firm  -0.50  -3.70 **  -0.52  -2.97 **  -0.05  -0.20   0.11  0.28  
Private  domestic/foreign  -0.23 -1.83  +  -0.25 -1.46    -0.05 -0.21    -0.24 -0.79   
State/private  domestic  -0.33  -0.84        1.48  1.54       
State/private foreign   -0.27  -0.95         0.46  0.85        
State/private  foreign/domestic  -0.29  -0.61        3.73  0.01       
Formal  debt/capital  0.83 3.32  **  0.63 2.14  *  1.44 3.97  ** 1.66 3.81  ** 
Formal debt/capital squared  -0.25  -2.15 *  -0.13  -1.04   -0.41  -2.74 **  -0.50  -2.94 ** 
Overdraft/capital  0.06 0.79    0.04 0.52    -0.30  -1.40    -0.17  -0.76  
Access to overdraft?  -0.21  -2.04 *  -0.18  -1.51   0.53  2.59 **  0.61  2.42 * 
Pred. profit/capital ratio              0.95  2.30 *  1.03  2.01 * 
Micro firm          0.13  0.70   0.18  0.87   -2.06  -3.69 **  -1.96  -3.03 ** 
Small firm           -0.07  -0.53   -0.07  -0.39   -0.73  -2.89 **  -0.75  -2.25 * 
Medium firm         -0.27  -2.38 *  -0.26  -1.80 *  -0.61  -3.14 **  -0.58  -2.39 * 
Firm age           -0.01  -2.53 *  -0.01  -1.89 *  0.00  -0.72   0.00  -0.44  
Accounts?         -0.42  -3.48 **  -0.49  -3.72 **  0.38  1.61   0.42  1.61  
Firm in capital city?  -0.01  -0.10   -0.11  -1.05   0.24  1.38   0.28  1.33  
Cote  d’Ivoire  0.89 5.17  **  0.88 3.91  ** -0.98  -1.62    -1.51  -1.81  + 
Cameroon          0.74  5.55 **  0.88  5.24 **  -0.49  -1.37   -0.49  -1.14  
Zimbabwe       0.08  0.66   0.17  1.09   -0.15  -0.66   -0.13  -0.46  
Ghana         0.31  2.50 *  0.43  2.54 *  -0.27  -1.05   -0.44  -1.17  
Burundi         0.06  0.24   0.40  1.34   -0.71  -1.51   -0.64  -1.12  
Age  owner      0.00  0.49        -0.01  -1.06   
Born in this town?        0.28  2.22 *        0.20  0.80  
Time spent in this town        -0.01  -1.87 +        0.00  0.33  
own other business?        0.25  2.42 *        -0.18  -0.77  
sex  owner      0.60  2.50  *      0.21  0.37   
Other business in sector?        0.14  1.18         0.20  0.99  
own house,vehicle, farm?        -0.03  -0.23         -0.14  -0.66  
Informal  debt/capital  -0.01 -0.06    -0.02 -0.12             
Profit/capital  ratio  0.00 -0.14    0.02  0.51             
Mandated  investment  -0.09 -1.66  +  -0.07 -1.10             
Constant  -0.12 -0.53    -0.69 -1.70  +  -1.78 -3.57  ** -1.66 -1.83  + 
Selection  term           0.83  1.61    0.96  1.42   
Number of observations    1322     985     551     440  
Wald    52.39  **    49.08  *         
LR test on selection term                1.58     1.11  
Base groups: private domestic firms, firms with limited liability legal status, Kenya, large firms. 
Regression controls also for sectors and for year using dummies. 
**=significant at 1% 
*=significant at 5% 
+=significant at 10% 
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Table 12    Random effects probit model 
  Demand? Demand  satisfied? 
  all firms  Firms with owner 
characteristics 
all firms  Firms with owner 
characteristics 
  Coef. z-value  Coef. z-value  Coef. z-value Coef.  z-value 
Solo  firm  -0.02 -0.16   -0.05  -0.34  -0.01 -0.05  -0.12 -0.46   
Partnership  0.12  0.55   -0.08  -0.37  -0.50 -1.28  -0.48 -1.29   
State  corporation  0.35  0.79       -0.06 -0.08        
Cooperative  1.21  2.36 *  1.40  2.30 *  0.86  1.31    0.49  0.69   
Subsidiary  domestic  0.13  0.38   0.32  0.42  -0.02 -0.04        
Subsidiary  foreign  -0.22 -0.50        0.00  0.00        
Private foreign firm  -0.60  -3.42 **  -0.65  -2.86 **  0.31  0.89    0.45  1.06   
Private  domestic/foreign  -0.29 -1.74  +  -0.34  -1.57   0.11  0.36  -0.14 -0.39   
State/private  domestic  -0.27 -0.55        2.23  1.73  +       
State/private  foreign    -0.32 -0.82        0.76  1.03        
State/private  foreign/  domestic  -0.46 -0.77                  
Formal debt/capital  0.92  2.95 **  0.65  1.82 +  1.61  2.92 **  1.68  3.51 ** 
formal debt/capital squared  -0.26  -1.89 +  -0.13  -0.87    -0.45  -2.12 *  -0.54  -2.89 ** 
Informal  debt/capital  0.01  0.06   -002  -0.08             
Overdraft/capital  0.05  0.55   -0.17  -1.18  -0.50 -1.61  -0.27 -1.08   
Access to overdraft?  -0.21  -1.67 +  0.04  0.40    0.82  3.35 **  0.82  3.62 ** 
Pred. profit/capital ratio        0.00  0.00    1.37  2.43 **  1.34  2.38 * 
Profit/capital  ratio  0.02  0.39   0.04  0.80             
Mandated  investment  -0.05 -0.68   0.00  -0.01             
Micro  firm  0.20  0.85   0.26  0.99  -2.97 -3.52  ** -2.53 -4.22  ** 
Small  firm  -0.07 -0.43   -0.04  -0.22  -1.03 -2.98  ** -0.96 -3.05  ** 
Medium firm  -0.32  -2.17 *  -0.29  -1.59    -0.72  -2.62 **  -0.61  -2.19 * 
Firm age  -0.01  -2.48 *  -0.01  -1.72 +  0.00  0.07    0.00  0.08   
Accounts?  -0.49  -3.34 **  -0.56  -3.57 **  0.71  2.33 *  0.70  2.65 ** 
Firm in capital city?  -0.04  -0.37    -0.17  -1.30    0.40  1.71 +  0.44  1.98 + 
Age  owner       0.00  0.27       -0.01 -1.08   
Born in this town?        0.00  -0.01          0.08  0.26   
Time spent in this town        0.00  -1.19          0.01  1.04   
Own other business?        0.30  2.25 *        -0.41  -1.92 + 
Sex  owner       0.67  2.28  *       0.00  0.01   
Other business in sector?        0.16  1.09          0.12  0.50   
Own  house,vehicle,  farm?       -0.11  -0.74       -0.14 -0.54   
Zimbabwe  0.08  0.53   0.09  0.47  -0.26 -0.83  -0.31 -0.91   
Cameroon  0.69  3.71 **  0.69  2.89 **  -1.07  -2.78 **  -1.18  -2.76 ** 
Ghana  0.55  3.27 **  0.60  2.74 **  -0.59  -1.86    -0.86  -2.33 ** 
Cote d’Ivoire  0.80  3.42 **  0.57  1.82 +  -1.94  -2.65 **  -2.62  -3.04 ** 
Burundi  0.11  0.37   0.30  0.82  -1.13 -1.76  +  -1.05 -1.63   
Constant  0.30  0.91   -0.29  -0.48  -1.67 -2.37  *  -0.47 -0.43   
Observations (groups)  1322 (785)  985(585)  551 (420)  440 (333) 
Test on ρ (heterogeneity)
a  χ
2 (1)=  21.16 **  χ
2 (1)=  12.45 **  χ
2(1)=  1.42   χ
2 (1)=  0.00   
Wald joint significance  χ
2 (36)=  135.3 **  χ
2 (38)=  106.9 **  χ
2 (34)=  36.53 **  χ
2 (34)=  113.3 ** 
Base groups: private domestic firms, firms with limited liability legal status, Kenya, large firms. 
Regression controls also for sectors and for year using dummies. 
aThis tests the presence of group-wise autocorrelation in the errors, with the null of ρ=0. 
**=significant at 1% 
*=significant at 5% 
+=significant at 10%   23 
Table 13  Fixed effects logit model (all firms) 
  Demand for credit?  Satisfied? 
  Coefficient z-value    Coefficient z-value   
Formal debt/capital  1.56  1.90 +  2.34  0.29   
Formal debt/capital squared  -0.44  -1.38    10.12  0.61   
Informal  debt/capital  -0.11  -0.16       
Overdraft/capital  -0.54  -0.97   -3.57  -0.69  
Access to overdraft?  -0.48  -1.08    -3.07  -1.15   
Profit/capital ratio  0.27  1.96 *       
Mandated  investment  -0.24  -1.16       
Log  employment  0.27  0.68   3.36  1.45  
Predicted profit/capital ratio        12.10  0.84   
Observations (groups)  378 (163)      296(127)     
LR joint significance  χ
2 (12)=  25.20 *  χ
2 (12)  18.36 + 
           
Formal  debt/capital  0.36  1.10   6.40  1.99 * 
Access to overdraft?  -0.69  -1.61    -2.88  -1.40   
Profit/capital ratio  0.20  1.65  +       
Predicted profit/capital ratio        7.12  1.77  + 
Log  employment  0.23  0.59   1.99  1.49  
Observations (groups)  378(163)      52 (24)     
LR joint significance  χ
2 (5)  16.50 **  χ
2 (4)=  15.15 * 
Regression includes year dummies.  Note that estimations only use those firms changing status over 
time 
**=significant at 1% 
*=significant at 5% 
+=significant at 10% 
 
However, the random effects estimator assumes that the heterogeneity is not 
correlated with other variables in the regression. Since this may not be correct, 
especially for variables of interest such as the formal debt or size variables, it is useful 
to consider fixed effects estimators as well. Table 13 reports the fixed effects logit 
models for the demand for external finance and the question whether this demand is 
satisfied.  Relatively few firms report a change in the left hand side variables 
(especially on having credit demand satisfied), so to retain sufficient degrees of 
freedom, we restricted the explanatory variables, based on some experimentation, 
such as excluding some variables systematically insignificant in the other regressions. 
The size dummies were replaced by the log of employment. We also report an even 
more restricted model, retaining only significant or nearly significant variables in the 
first regression. Despite the small data set, some of the earlier results appear quite 
robust when looking at credit allocation. In particular, when looking at all firms, 
predicted profitability appears to play a positive role in the bank’s allocation rules. 
Furthermore, the effect of outstanding formal debt is retained as well. Employment is 
only significant at 12 percent, but given the small sample this means it cannot easily 
be discarded, especially since this specification controls for fixed effects: relatively 
small movements in employment appear to affect the probability of obtaining credit 
when demanded
18.  This would give support for the view that firm size in itself is a 
                                                            
18 Calculating marginal effects from the fixed effects logit model is not self-evident since the probability 
of a particular outcome (and therefore the marginal effects) still contain the firm-specific fixed effects in 
a non-linear function.   24 
source of bias in credit allocation: a change in employment in a relatively short period 
affects the probability of banks allocating credit. Since this finding is present after 
controlling for observed and unobserved underlying characteristics of firms, it is less 
likely to be a reflection of relatively high transactions costs on the part of banks to 
allocate loans to these smaller firms
19.   
 
Another way of looking at the firm size effect is to consider the way banks appear to 
require a small firm to have a higher (predicted) profitability before they offer a loan 
to it, compared to a larger firm. Table 14 and figure 1 illustrate this, based on the 
conditional results of the sample selection specification. For a firm with mean 
characteristics, the probability that it will obtain a loan when it desires is about 21 
percent.  Keeping other characteristics constant, a medium firm would need a 
profitability ratio of 56 percent, but this increases to more than 200 percent for a micro 
firm. A large firm would in this case even get a loan with this probability when its 
profit/capital ratio would be minus 8 percent.  Similar differences are obtained at 
higher probabilities of receiving a loan. Figure 1 shows this relationship as well, but 
this time from a slightly different specification in which the size dummies are replaced 
with the log of employment in the sample selection model, allowing a smooth 
relationship between predicted profitability needed and firm size. For large firms, 
expected profitability seems not at all important, while for small and micro firms, the 
required profitability increases fast.  The higher demands imposed on small and micro 
firms in allocating loans is a sign of a bias against them. 
 
Table 14   Predicted profitability relative to firm size 
predicted profitability (profit over capital ratio)  
needed to receive a loan with probability of 
firm size (number 
employees) 
21 percent  31 percent  42 percent 
micro  (1-5)  2.08 2.46 2.83 
small  (6-25)  0.69 1.06 1.44 
medium  (26-100)  0.56 0.93 1.31 
large (100+)  -0.08  0.30  0.67 
Source: calculated from regression for all firms (sample selection model in table 11) 
 
The systematic relationship between obtaining credit in a particular year and 
outstanding formal debt remains striking.  While the effect is non-linear and at very 
high values of indebtness becomes negative, there is wide interval of values for which 
debt appears to help access to loans, which is not in line with expectations. One 
possible interpretation is that the lending market is hard to penetrate but, once entered, 
it provides systematic access to credit. Long-term relationships between firms and 
banks could be a source of improved information and trust. However, while possibly 
reflecting long-term relationships, high debt over capital ratios can hardly be viewed 
positive signs of creditworthiness, as the actual banking screening rule appears to 
suggest. This hysteresis effect may be a reflection of inefficiency in the formal credit 
market.  In the end, it shows that there is too much lending for some types of firms. 
 
                                                            
19This would not be a sign of a bias if costs are directly related to firm size and not related to 
unobserved characteristics that are typically present in small firms.  Of course, we cannot exclude this 
possibility so that the evidence is still only suggestive rather than conclusive.   25 
Personal relationships between firms and banks could also provide a source of 
reduced transactions and monitoring costs. Unfortunately, the data does not include 
much information that could be used for this purpose, while variables such as being 
born in the current town of residence and how long one has lived in this town appear 
not significant. In the data, with the exception of the Ghana survey rounds used, 
information on the ethnic background (broadly defined) of firm owners was also 
collected. Applying the basic sample selection model for the remaining countries, but 
this time including ethnicity, we found that in credit allocation these factors play a 
role. In particular, firms owned by Africans have more often a demand for external 
finance, probably suggesting that the other groups (firms owned by European, Middle 
Eastern or Asian enterpeneurs) have access to alternative sources (significant at 1 
percent). Asian firm owners typically have a 25 percent higher probability to obtain 
credit than African owners (significant at 5 percent). Most Asian firm owners in the 
sample live in Kenya. Here, Asian businessmen are typically well connected: they can 
rely on their networks to obtain credit outside the financial sector, but they also have 
networks within the financial sector, so that if they demand credit, they have a 
relatively high probability to obtain the loan
20.  
 
Thusfar, we only reported the results for the data set in which data for all countries are 
pooled, allowing for a constant different effect per country. How robust are our key 
results across countries? We conducted a set of pooling likelihood ratio tests in the 
form of linear restrictions on more a general formulation of model, in which the 
formal debt ratio, firm size and predicted profit were interacted with country 
dummies. We used the sample selection model for this purpose
21.  Both on these three 




This does not mean that there are no country-level effects: relative to Kenya, the 
regressions in table 11 and 12 systematically report more firms not obtaining credit 
when desired in Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire and Cameroon. The pooling tests reported 
before suggest that the explanation cannot be found in a different bank screening 
policy towards expected profitability, firm size and formal sector debt. The country 
effects are shifters in the probability of obtaining credit, valid for all types of firms.  
To put some meaning to these different country effects, we repeated the regressions on 
whether credit demand is satisfied but this time replacing the country dummies by the 
continuous characteristics reported in table 1. While interest rates and growth in GDP 
was not significant, we found a significant effect on M2 over GDP, a measure of 
financial deepening. In the sample selection model, the marginal effect suggested that 
a one percent in increase in M2/GDP would result in a 1.4 percent higher probability 
that a typical firm would obtain credit when demanded.  A large part of the difference 
                                                            
20 Raturi and Swamy (1997) convincingly analyse this issue further for Zimbabwe, focusing on whether 
the observed patterns are reflecting discrimination. 
21 Expanding the number of explanatory variables for this purpose resulted in problems of convergence 
in the random effects model. Also, since in the final data set with complete information, not all 
countries have firms in each group with a demand for credit, the size dummies were replaced by the log 
of employment. In the restricted regression, this variable was significant with a t-value of more than 5, 
providing again strong evidence of a positive correlation between high debt and access to loans. 
22 The likelihood ratio test on the restrictions could not be rejected at 8 percent (log employment), 3 
percent (predicted profitability), 1 percent (debt over capital ratio) or at 1 percent (all three).   26 
between countries picked up by the country dummies appears to be explained by this 
variable, since the Pseudo R
2 on the regression only drops from 0.35 to 0.34 when the 
country and year dummies are dropped and replaced by this continuous variable. In 
other words, differences in financial deepening between countries such as Kenya or 
Zimbabwe relative to Ghana or Burundi appear to explain some of the differences in 
credit demand approvals in the sample.   
 
However, differences in financial deepening or other characteristics between countries 
cannot explain the differential treatment of firms of different sizes in the credit 
market.  As a consequence, the credit allocation practices biasing against smaller firms 
can only be linked to factors that are present across these different countries: for 
example, information problems or problems related to contract enforcement, including 
problems with property rights affecting access to collateral. Some of these issues are 
known to be problematic across African countries in general. Collier and Gunning 
(1999) have pointed to higher risk of contract default in Africa than in other regions 
due to less trustworthy accounts or problems to physically honour contracts on time in 
economies with poor transport and other infrastructure.  The lack of a financial press 
or the absence of credit-rating agencies – linked to the small size of the economies 
involved – make financial information costs very high. Serious problems with 
property rights, such as land in many countries, reduce the options for using collateral. 
These factors may well explain some of the bias against credit allocation by the banks. 
If so, note that intervention in credit markets, for example via targeted credit 
allocation to smaller firms, may not be successful without addressing these underlying 





We investigated the question whether firms in the manufacturing sector in Africa are 
credit constrained. The fact that few firms obtain credit is not sufficient to prove 
constraints, since certain firms may not have a demand for credit while others may be 
refused credit as part of profit maximising behaviour by banks. To investigate this 
question, we use direct evidence on whether firms had a demand of credit and whether 
their demand was satisfied in the formal credit market, based on panel data on firms in 
the manufacturing sector from six African countries.  
 
We find that more than half the firms in the sample had no demand for credit. Of 
those firms with a demand for credit, only a quarter obtained a formal sector loan.  In 
line with expectations, our analysis suggests further that banks allocate credit on the 
basis of expected profits. However, controlling for credit demand, outstanding debt is 
positively related with obtaining further lending while micro, small and medium sized 
firms are less likely to get a loan. The latter effect is strong and present in the 
regression, despite including several variables typically referred to as explaining why 
small or ‘informal’ firms do not get credit. These include whether the firm keeps 
accounts, information on assets owned by the owner, residency and location.  
 
The role of outstanding debt is likely to be a reflection of inefficiency in credit 
markets, while the fact that size matters is consistent with a bias against smaller firms. 
The former would suggest too much, the latter too little lending on the part of banks.    27 
Although we cannot exclude that these effects reflect transactions costs on the part of 
banks, some of the evidence does not favour this interpretation. Finally, we could not 
detect any differences between countries in the effects of these factors in the credit 
allocation rule, although financial deepening is found to explain most of the country-
specific fixed effects, shifting the probability of obtaining credit across the firm 
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Appendix 1: Survey dates 
Table A.1  Years to which data apply 
  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Ghana x  x  x     
Côte d’Ivoire        x  x 
Burundi   x      
Zimbabwe   x  x  x   
Kenya   x  x  x   
Cameroon     x  x  x 
 
 
Appendix 2: Desired capital stock and mandated investment 
 
Caballero et al. (1995) define mandated investment as the deviation between desired 




* - kit-1 (A1) 
 
where kit
* and kit-1 are the log of desired and actual capital. Desired capital, the stock 
that firms would hold if adjustment costs were temporarily removed, is equal to 
frictionless capital, the stock would hold if they never faced adjustment costs, plus a 
firm specific constant.  
 
To estimate desired capital, we follow the procedure explained in Bigsten et al. 
(1999b). Since desired capital equals frictionless capital plus a firm-specific constant, 
we estimate the log of desired capital as a function of log output and a firm specific 
constant using fixed effects. We impose no restrictions on the output elasticity. 
However, desired capital is not observable. Following Caballero et al. (1995), we 
assume that deviations from desired and actual capital stock are stationary over time. 
Consequently, we can use the actual stock series and interpret the regression as 
determining long-run desired capital. Our measure of the firm’s desired capital is the 
predicted value from this regression.  
 
Note that to calculate mandated investment using desired capital, we need to use the 
capital stock in the previous. This would result in the loss of a further observation. To 
avoid this, in our calculations of mandated investment, we used the capital stock net 
of investment in the current year as a measure of capital in the beginning of the 
current year, so that no further observation is lost.    31 
Appendix 3:  The Decision to Apply for a Loan 
 
While the main results will be obtained using these binary models, we report another 
test on the model structure.  In the paper, we argued that the division of firms into 
groups according to demand for external funds and whether the demand was met is 
more appropriate to investigate credit market constraints than simply looking at 
whether firms apply and whether applications are approved. Effectively, this means 
that the group facing credit market constraints include both firms not applying but 
with an apparent credit demand as well as firms applying but not receiving the loan. In 
the theoretical framework, we allowed that firms may prefer external over internal 
funds ((a), (b) and (c) on page 7), but did not apply because of low perceived success 
rate, lack of collateral or high application costs ((d) and (e) on page 8). Our empirical 
approach of pooling firms applying and not applying in one group, if they appear to 
have a demand for external funds, can be tested.  
 
We run the model for the demand for credit using a multinomial logit model with four 
options and test whether pooling is appropriate between the groups using a test of 
restrictions
23. In particular, we divide the firms in four sub-sets: A,B,C,D. Those 
applying and receiving are in D. Those applying and not receiving a loan are in C, 
those not applying are in A∪B. Those not wanting a loan are in A, while those 
wanting a loan but not applying are in B. Consequently, those firms ‘constrained’ in 
the credit market are in B∪C . The test of interest is then the pooling of B and C in the 
model. 
 
We used the full list of variables used in the estimations of (12). It turned out that 
pooling of the two regimes is just rejected at 1 percent. However, adding a shifter for 
micro-firms, pooling is possible at 2 percent for all firms and at 6 percent for privately 
owned firms. The relative value of the coefficients on the dummy for micro firms 
suggests that micro firms are less likely to actually apply even if they have a demand 
for credit.  This could be a reflecting of concave transactions costs for loan 
applications, implying relatively high costs for a firm operating on a very small scale. 
However, it may also be a consequence of the low perceived success rate for such 
firms – a perception which turned out to be correct according to our subsequent 
analysis. Note that the descriptive analysis in table 7 suggests that the perceived low 
chances of obtaining a loan are the main reason, not difficulties and costs of the 
process. 
 
Another means of testing this confirmed these findings. Conditioning on firms that 
expressed a demand for external funds, we did a probit regression on whether firms 
actually applied or not, using the same variables as in the model for the demand for 
external funds. Micro-firms with a demand for external funds were 46 percent less 
likely to apply for loans and this effect was significant at 1 percent. The coefficient on 
small firms was only significant at 10 percent and on medium firms was not 
significant.  
                                                            
23 Note that the distributional and other assumptions of the multinomial logit are different from those 
used in the bivariate probit. However, using an alternative model, such as the multinomial probit with 
sample selection to test the pooling of the groups is not feasible, since it would involve the evaluation of 
complex higher order multivariate normal integrals (for a discussion, see Greene, p.663).    32 
 
High transactions costs for certain firms imply a deviation an inefficiency in credit 
markets. However, to the extent that limited loan applications by micro-firms are 
simply a consequence of these relatively high transactions costs when applying for a 
small loan, it is hard to see how intervention may correct this failure. The findings 
also suggest that the subsequent bias against micro or small firms in terms of credit 
allocation, in the sense of an unwarranted exclusion of these firms from credit, is 
smaller than predicted.  
 
Finally, our results from the pooling tests in this appendix does not suggest that 
transactions costs are relatively high for small and medium firms relative to large 
firms. Since our results on credit allocation in section 5 suggest that small or medium 
firms also face a bias, distinguishing an additional stage in the decision model (12) to 
model applications, is not likely to change the overall findings. 
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Appendix 4 : Predicted Profits 
 
Table A.2 Prediction model profits rate (profits over capital) (n=1321) 
 coefficient  t-value   
wood sector  0.01  0.16  
textile sector  -0.02  -0.29  
metal sector  -0.16  -1.81 + 
state sector  0.10  0.26  
solo firm  0.16  1.79 + 
Partnership   -0.01  -0.06  
Private corporation   -0.19  -1.55  
State corporation   -0.44  -1.32  
Subsidiary domestic firm  -0.09  -0.42  
State/private domestic firm   0.14  0.56  
Subsidiary foreign   0.13  0.58  
Private foreign firm   0.01  0.09  
Private domestic firm   0.07  0.72  
State/private domestic firm  -0.32  -0.99  
State/private, domestic and foreign firm   -0.06  -0.16  
Capital city?   -0.08  -0.51  
Ghana*wave 1   0.15  0.66  
Ghana*wave 2   -0.09  -0.52  
Ghana*wave 3   -0.20  -1.22  
Cote d’Ivoire*wave 1   0.35  1.78  
Cote d’Ivoire*wave 2   0.82  4.20 ** 
Cameroon*wave 1   0.26  1.21  
Cameroon*wave 2   -0.03  -0.14  
Cameroon*wave 3   -0.17  -0.84  
Kenya*wave 1   -0.04  -0.23  
Kenya*wave 2   -0.03  -0.17  
Kenya*wave 3   -0.15  -0.94  
Burundi   0.02  0.11  
Zimbabwe*wave 2   -0.03  -0.23  
Zimbabwe*wave 3   0.06  0.39  
micro firm  0.31  2.29 * 
small firm  0.11  1.04  
medium firm  0.06  0.66  
constant 0.75  4.23  ** 
Further controls for location (towns) included 
Joint significance F( 45,  1275) =    2.57** 
R-squared     =  0.083 
Adj R-squared =  0.051 
**=significant at 1% 
*=significant at 5% 









Source: calculated from regression for all firms (sample selection model in table 11), 






levels of employment and profit rates given constant 






































receiving a loan with probability of 20 percent 
receiving a loan with probability of 31 percent 
receiving a loan with probability of 42 percent 